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package/python3: add upstream security patch for CVE-2026-7774

Browse Source 
https://mail.python.org/archives/list/security-announce@python.org/thread/4FU62L2M6RMMHT2QPGQNPEHHUND7CEX5/

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd@kuhls.net>
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
This commit is contained in:
Bernd Kuhls
2026-06-04 19:37:06 +02:00
committed by Julien Olivain
parent 08f8c44d15
commit 67ec0e9c20
2 changed files with 271 additions and 0 deletions
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268
package/python3/0012-3.14-gh-149486-tarfile.data_filter-validate-written-.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
From 74cca9a92fb7d653e404843a56b8bdc7b0afdbbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 11:57:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [3.14] gh-149486: tarfile.data_filter: validate written link
target (GH-149487) (GH-149554)
* gh-149486: tarfile.data_filter: validate written link target (GH-149487)
The data filter rewrote linknames with normpath() but ran the
containment check against the un-normalised value, and computed a
symlink's directory before stripping trailing slashes. Both let a
crafted archive create links pointing outside the destination. Also
reject link members that resolve to the destination directory itself,
which could otherwise replace it with a symlink and redirect all
subsequent members.
(Patch by Greg; Petr's just reviewing & merging.)
(cherry picked from commit 578411982c16f753f4893532510099ef665117da)
Co-authored-by: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/74cca9a92fb7d653e404843a56b8bdc7b0afdbbf
CVE: CVE-2026-7774
Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd@kuhls.net>
---
Lib/tarfile.py | 16 +-
Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 151 ++++++++++++++----
...-05-03-21-00-00.gh-issue-149486.tarflt.rst | 5 +
3 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-05-03-21-00-00.gh-issue-149486.tarflt.rst
diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
index 414aefe9744..a9eca7579ef 100644
--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
@@ -830,16 +830,22 @@ def _get_filtered_attrs(member, dest_path, for_data=True):
if member.islnk() or member.issym():
if os.path.isabs(member.linkname):
raise AbsoluteLinkError(member)
+ # A link member that resolves to the destination directory itself
+ # would replace it with a (sym)link, redirecting the destination
+ # for all subsequent members.
+ if target_path == dest_path:
+ raise OutsideDestinationError(member, target_path)
normalized = os.path.normpath(member.linkname)
if normalized != member.linkname:
new_attrs['linkname'] = normalized
if member.issym():
- target_path = os.path.join(dest_path,
- os.path.dirname(name),
- member.linkname)
+ # The symlink is created at `name` with trailing separators
+ # stripped, so its target is relative to the directory
+ # containing that path.
+ link_dir = os.path.dirname(name.rstrip('/' + os.sep))
+ target_path = os.path.join(dest_path, link_dir, normalized)
else:
- target_path = os.path.join(dest_path,
- member.linkname)
+ target_path = os.path.join(dest_path, normalized)
target_path = os.path.realpath(target_path,
strict=os.path.ALLOW_MISSING)
if os.path.commonpath([target_path, dest_path]) != dest_path:
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
index 8d9f8824f7c..837b6aa8c03 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
@@ -3682,6 +3682,39 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase):
# The destination for the extraction, within `outerdir`
destdir = outerdir / 'dest'
+ @classmethod
+ def setUpClass(cls):
+ # Posix and Windows have different pathname resolution:
+ # either symlink or a '..' component resolve first.
+ # Let's see which we are on.
+ if os_helper.can_symlink():
+ testpath = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, 'resolution_test')
+ os.mkdir(testpath)
+
+ # testpath/current links to `.` which is all of:
+ # - `testpath`
+ # - `testpath/current`
+ # - `testpath/current/current`
+ # - etc.
+ os.symlink('.', os.path.join(testpath, 'current'))
+
+ # we'll test where `testpath/current/../file` ends up
+ with open(os.path.join(testpath, 'current', '..', 'file'), 'w'):
+ pass
+
+ if os.path.exists(os.path.join(testpath, 'file')):
+ # Windows collapses 'current\..' to '.' first, leaving
+ # 'testpath\file'
+ cls.dotdot_resolves_early = True
+ elif os.path.exists(os.path.join(testpath, '..', 'file')):
+ # Posix resolves 'current' to '.' first, leaving
+ # 'testpath/../file'
+ cls.dotdot_resolves_early = False
+ else:
+ raise AssertionError('Could not determine link resolution')
+ else:
+ cls.dotdot_resolves_early = False
+
@contextmanager
def check_context(self, tar, filter, *, check_flag=True):
"""Extracts `tar` to `self.destdir` and allows checking the result
@@ -3853,10 +3886,19 @@ def test_parent_symlink(self):
+ "which is outside the destination")
with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
- self.expect_exception(
- tarfile.LinkOutsideDestinationError,
- """'parent' would link to ['"].*outerdir['"], """
- + "which is outside the destination")
+ if self.dotdot_resolves_early:
+ # 'current/../..' normalises to '..', which is rejected.
+ self.expect_exception(
+ tarfile.LinkOutsideDestinationError,
+ """'parent' would link to ['"].*outerdir['"], """
+ + "which is outside the destination")
+ else:
+ # 'current/..' normalises to '.'; the rewritten link is
+ # created and 'parent/evil' lands harmlessly inside the
+ # destination.
+ self.expect_file('current', symlink_to='.')
+ self.expect_file('parent', symlink_to='.')
+ self.expect_file('evil')
else:
# No symlink support. The symlinks are ignored.
@@ -3946,35 +3988,6 @@ def test_parent_symlink2(self):
# Test interplaying symlinks
# Inspired by 'dirsymlink2b' in jwilk/traversal-archives
- # Posix and Windows have different pathname resolution:
- # either symlink or a '..' component resolve first.
- # Let's see which we are on.
- if os_helper.can_symlink():
- testpath = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, 'resolution_test')
- os.mkdir(testpath)
-
- # testpath/current links to `.` which is all of:
- # - `testpath`
- # - `testpath/current`
- # - `testpath/current/current`
- # - etc.
- os.symlink('.', os.path.join(testpath, 'current'))
-
- # we'll test where `testpath/current/../file` ends up
- with open(os.path.join(testpath, 'current', '..', 'file'), 'w'):
- pass
-
- if os.path.exists(os.path.join(testpath, 'file')):
- # Windows collapses 'current\..' to '.' first, leaving
- # 'testpath\file'
- dotdot_resolves_early = True
- elif os.path.exists(os.path.join(testpath, '..', 'file')):
- # Posix resolves 'current' to '.' first, leaving
- # 'testpath/../file'
- dotdot_resolves_early = False
- else:
- raise AssertionError('Could not determine link resolution')
-
with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
# `current` links to `.` which is both the destination directory
@@ -4010,7 +4023,7 @@ def test_parent_symlink2(self):
with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
if os_helper.can_symlink():
- if dotdot_resolves_early:
+ if self.dotdot_resolves_early:
# Fail when extracting a file outside destination
self.expect_exception(
tarfile.OutsideDestinationError,
@@ -4130,6 +4143,76 @@ def test_sly_relative2(self):
+ """['"].*moo['"], which is outside the """
+ "destination")
+ @symlink_test
+ @os_helper.skip_unless_symlink
+ def test_normpath_realpath_mismatch(self):
+ # The link-target check must validate the value that will actually
+ # be written to disk (the normalised linkname), not the original.
+ # Here 'a' is a symlink to a deep nonexistent path, so realpath()
+ # of 'a/../../...' stays inside the destination while normpath()
+ # collapses 'a/..' lexically and escapes.
+ depth = len(self.destdir.parts) + 5
+ deep = '/'.join(f'p{i}' for i in range(depth))
+ sneaky = 'a/' + '../' * depth + 'flag'
+ for kind in 'symlink_to', 'hardlink_to':
+ with self.subTest(kind):
+ with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
+ arc.add('a', symlink_to=deep)
+ arc.add('escape', **{kind: sneaky})
+ with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
+ self.expect_exception(
+ tarfile.LinkOutsideDestinationError)
+
+ @symlink_test
+ @os_helper.skip_unless_symlink
+ def test_symlink_trailing_slash(self):
+ # A trailing slash on a symlink member's name must not cause the
+ # link target to be resolved relative to the wrong directory.
+ with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
+ t = tarfile.TarInfo('x/')
+ t.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
+ t.linkname = '..'
+ arc.tar_w.addfile(t)
+ arc.add('x/escaped', content='hi')
+
+ with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
+ self.expect_exception(tarfile.LinkOutsideDestinationError)
+
+ @symlink_test
+ @os_helper.skip_unless_symlink
+ def test_link_at_destination(self):
+ # A link member whose name resolves to the destination directory
+ # itself must be rejected: otherwise the destination is replaced
+ # by a symlink and later members can be redirected through it.
+ for name in '', '.', './':
+ with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
+ t = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
+ t.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
+ t.linkname = '.'
+ arc.tar_w.addfile(t)
+
+ with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
+ self.expect_exception(tarfile.OutsideDestinationError)
+
+ @symlink_test
+ @os_helper.skip_unless_symlink
+ def test_empty_name_symlink_chain(self):
+ # Regression test for a chain of empty-named symlinks that
+ # incrementally redirects the destination outwards.
+ with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
+ for name, target in [('', ''), ('a/', '..'),
+ ('', 'dummy'), ('', 'a'),
+ ('b/', '..'),
+ ('', 'dummy'), ('', 'a/b')]:
+ t = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
+ t.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
+ t.linkname = target
+ arc.tar_w.addfile(t)
+ arc.add('escaped', content='hi')
+
+ with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
+ self.expect_exception(tarfile.FilterError)
+
@symlink_test
def test_deep_symlink(self):
# Test that symlinks and hardlinks inside a directory
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-05-03-21-00-00.gh-issue-149486.tarflt.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-05-03-21-00-00.gh-issue-149486.tarflt.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7c69edb683c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-05-03-21-00-00.gh-issue-149486.tarflt.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+:func:`tarfile.data_filter` now validates link targets using the same
+normalised value that is written to disk, strips trailing separators from
+the member name when resolving a symlink's directory, and rejects link
+members that would replace the destination directory itself. This closes
+several path-traversal bypasses of the ``data`` extraction filter.
--
2.47.3

3
package/python3/python3.mk
View File

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ PYTHON3_CPE_ID_PRODUCT = python
# 0011-3.14-gh-149079-Fix-O-n-2-canonical-ordering-in-unico.patch
PYTHON3_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-3276
# 0012-3.14-gh-149486-tarfile.data_filter-validate-written-.patch
PYTHON3_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-7774
# This host Python is installed in $(HOST_DIR), as it is needed when
# cross-compiling third-party Python modules.