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package/unzip: import patches from Debian

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In Buildroot there are multiple way to apply patches on a package [1]

- Adding `.patch` file in the package directory.
- Define `<pkg>_PATCH` variable with the location of the patch tar.gz.
  It used to download Debian patches tarball.
- Implement custom patching logic with `PRE`/`POST` patches hooks.

To make the CycloneDX SBOM generation not dependant on downloading the
packages, the two last options have the downside of not appearing on the
generated SBOM.

The unzip package is downloading a tarball from the Debian mirror with
the `<pkg>_PATCH` method [2].

To improve the tracking of the patched vulnerabilities for the unzip
package this commit import the patches previously downloaded with the
`_PATCH` variable in the Buildroot tree.
This allows to add the `CVE:` trailer [3] on the patches that fix
vulnerabilities to better track which patch is fixing the vulnerability.

[1] https://buildroot.org/downloads/manual/manual.html#patch-policy
[2] https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20250311T215724Z/pool/main/u/unzip/unzip_6.0-29.debian.tar.xz
[3] 1167d0ff3d docs/manual: mention CVE trailer

Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit fb8958e3dc)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Perale
2026-02-04 14:18:30 +01:00
parent 336e7a3ef1
commit 76db7e8a10
34 changed files with 1806 additions and 17 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
.checkpackageignore
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@@ -947,7 +947,6 @@ package/uhttpd/0002-Fix-TCP_FASTOPEN-related-compile-error.patch lib_patch.Upstr
package/unbound/S70unbound Shellcheck
package/unifdef/0001-Makefile-fix-error-on-install.patch lib_patch.Upstream
package/unscd/S46unscd Shellcheck lib_sysv.Indent lib_sysv.Variables
package/unzip/0001-Add-a-CMakeFile.txt-to-ease-cross-compilation.patch lib_patch.Upstream
package/upmpdcli/S99upmpdcli Shellcheck lib_sysv.Indent lib_sysv.Variables
package/urg/0001-select-h.patch lib_patch.Upstream
package/urg/0002-urg-gcc6-fix-narrowing-conversion.patch lib_patch.Upstream

297
package/unzip/0001-manpages-in-section-1-not-in-section-1l.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
From: Santiago Vila <sanvila@debian.org>
Subject: In Debian, manpages are in section 1, not in section 1L
X-Debian-version: 5.52-3
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/01-manpages-in-section-1-not-in-section-1l.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/man/funzip.1
+++ b/man/funzip.1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
.in -4n
..
.\" =========================================================================
-.TH FUNZIP 1L "20 April 2009 (v3.95)" "Info-ZIP"
+.TH FUNZIP 1 "20 April 2009 (v3.95)" "Info-ZIP"
.SH NAME
funzip \- filter for extracting from a ZIP archive in a pipe
.PD
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
.EE
.PP
To use \fIzip\fP and \fIfunzip\fP in place of \fIcompress\fP(1) and
-\fIzcat\fP(1) (or \fIgzip\fP(1L) and \fIgzcat\fP(1L)) for tape backups:
+\fIzcat\fP(1) (or \fIgzip\fP(1) and \fIgzcat\fP(1)) for tape backups:
.PP
.EX
tar cf \- . | zip \-7 | dd of=/dev/nrst0 obs=8k
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH "SEE ALSO"
-\fIgzip\fP(1L), \fIunzip\fP(1L), \fIunzipsfx\fP(1L), \fIzip\fP(1L),
-\fIzipcloak\fP(1L), \fIzipinfo\fP(1L), \fIzipnote\fP(1L), \fIzipsplit\fP(1L)
+\fIgzip\fP(1), \fIunzip\fP(1), \fIunzipsfx\fP(1), \fIzip\fP(1),
+\fIzipcloak\fP(1), \fIzipinfo\fP(1), \fIzipnote\fP(1), \fIzipsplit\fP(1)
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH URL
--- a/man/unzip.1
+++ b/man/unzip.1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
.in -4n
..
.\" =========================================================================
-.TH UNZIP 1L "20 April 2009 (v6.0)" "Info-ZIP"
+.TH UNZIP 1 "20 April 2009 (v6.0)" "Info-ZIP"
.SH NAME
unzip \- list, test and extract compressed files in a ZIP archive
.PD
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
\fIunzip\fP will list, test, or extract files from a ZIP archive, commonly
found on MS-DOS systems. The default behavior (with no options) is to extract
into the current directory (and subdirectories below it) all files from the
-specified ZIP archive. A companion program, \fIzip\fP(1L), creates ZIP
+specified ZIP archive. A companion program, \fIzip\fP(1), creates ZIP
archives; both programs are compatible with archives created by PKWARE's
\fIPKZIP\fP and \fIPKUNZIP\fP for MS-DOS, but in many cases the program
options or default behaviors differ.
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@
list of all possible flags. The exhaustive list follows:
.TP
.B \-Z
-\fIzipinfo\fP(1L) mode. If the first option on the command line is \fB\-Z\fP,
-the remaining options are taken to be \fIzipinfo\fP(1L) options. See the
+\fIzipinfo\fP(1) mode. If the first option on the command line is \fB\-Z\fP,
+the remaining options are taken to be \fIzipinfo\fP(1) options. See the
appropriate manual page for a description of these options.
.TP
.B \-A
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
compressed size and compression ratio figures are independent of the entry's
encryption status and show the correct compression performance. (The complete
size of the encrypted compressed data stream for zipfile entries is reported
-by the more verbose \fIzipinfo\fP(1L) reports, see the separate manual.)
+by the more verbose \fIzipinfo\fP(1) reports, see the separate manual.)
When no zipfile is specified (that is, the complete command is simply
``\fCunzip \-v\fR''), a diagnostic screen is printed. In addition to
the normal header with release date and version, \fIunzip\fP lists the
@@ -379,8 +379,8 @@
.TP
.B \-N
[Amiga] extract file comments as Amiga filenotes. File comments are created
-with the \-c option of \fIzip\fP(1L), or with the \-N option of the Amiga port
-of \fIzip\fP(1L), which stores filenotes as comments.
+with the \-c option of \fIzip\fP(1), or with the \-N option of the Amiga port
+of \fIzip\fP(1), which stores filenotes as comments.
.TP
.B \-o
overwrite existing files without prompting. This is a dangerous option, so
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@
As suggested by the examples above, the default variable names are UNZIP_OPTS
for VMS (where the symbol used to install \fIunzip\fP as a foreign command
would otherwise be confused with the environment variable), and UNZIP
-for all other operating systems. For compatibility with \fIzip\fP(1L),
+for all other operating systems. For compatibility with \fIzip\fP(1),
UNZIPOPT is also accepted (don't ask). If both UNZIP and UNZIPOPT
are defined, however, UNZIP takes precedence. \fIunzip\fP's diagnostic
option (\fB\-v\fP with no zipfile name) can be used to check the values
@@ -648,8 +648,8 @@
a password is not known, entering a null password (that is, just a carriage
return or ``Enter'') is taken as a signal to skip all further prompting.
Only unencrypted files in the archive(s) will thereafter be extracted. (In
-fact, that's not quite true; older versions of \fIzip\fP(1L) and
-\fIzipcloak\fP(1L) allowed null passwords, so \fIunzip\fP checks each encrypted
+fact, that's not quite true; older versions of \fIzip\fP(1) and
+\fIzipcloak\fP(1) allowed null passwords, so \fIunzip\fP checks each encrypted
file to see if the null password works. This may result in ``false positives''
and extraction errors, as noted above.)
.PP
@@ -943,8 +943,8 @@
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH "SEE ALSO"
-\fIfunzip\fP(1L), \fIzip\fP(1L), \fIzipcloak\fP(1L), \fIzipgrep\fP(1L),
-\fIzipinfo\fP(1L), \fIzipnote\fP(1L), \fIzipsplit\fP(1L)
+\fIfunzip\fP(1), \fIzip\fP(1), \fIzipcloak\fP(1), \fIzipgrep\fP(1),
+\fIzipinfo\fP(1), \fIzipnote\fP(1), \fIzipsplit\fP(1)
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH URL
--- a/man/unzipsfx.1
+++ b/man/unzipsfx.1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
.in -4n
..
.\" =========================================================================
-.TH UNZIPSFX 1L "20 April 2009 (v6.0)" "Info-ZIP"
+.TH UNZIPSFX 1 "20 April 2009 (v6.0)" "Info-ZIP"
.SH NAME
unzipsfx \- self-extracting stub for prepending to ZIP archives
.PD
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH DESCRIPTION
-\fIunzipsfx\fP is a modified version of \fIunzip\fP(1L) designed to be
+\fIunzipsfx\fP is a modified version of \fIunzip\fP(1) designed to be
prepended to existing ZIP archives in order to form self-extracting archives.
Instead of taking its first non-flag argument to be the zipfile(s) to be
extracted, \fIunzipsfx\fP seeks itself under the name by which it was invoked
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH OPTIONS
-\fIunzipsfx\fP supports the following \fIunzip\fP(1L) options: \fB\-c\fP
+\fIunzipsfx\fP supports the following \fIunzip\fP(1) options: \fB\-c\fP
and \fB\-p\fP (extract to standard output/screen), \fB\-f\fP and \fB\-u\fP
(freshen and update existing files upon extraction), \fB\-t\fP (test
archive) and \fB\-z\fP (print archive comment). All normal listing options
@@ -118,11 +118,11 @@
those creating self-extracting archives may wish to include a short listing
in the zipfile comment.
.PP
-See \fIunzip\fP(1L) for a more complete description of these options.
+See \fIunzip\fP(1) for a more complete description of these options.
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH MODIFIERS
-\fIunzipsfx\fP currently supports all \fIunzip\fP(1L) modifiers: \fB\-a\fP
+\fIunzipsfx\fP currently supports all \fIunzip\fP(1) modifiers: \fB\-a\fP
(convert text files), \fB\-n\fP (never overwrite), \fB\-o\fP (overwrite
without prompting), \fB\-q\fP (operate quietly), \fB\-C\fP (match names
case-insensitively), \fB\-L\fP (convert uppercase-OS names to lowercase),
@@ -137,18 +137,18 @@
of course continue to be supported since the zipfile format implies ASCII
storage of text files.)
.PP
-See \fIunzip\fP(1L) for a more complete description of these modifiers.
+See \fIunzip\fP(1) for a more complete description of these modifiers.
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH "ENVIRONMENT OPTIONS"
-\fIunzipsfx\fP uses the same environment variables as \fIunzip\fP(1L) does,
+\fIunzipsfx\fP uses the same environment variables as \fIunzip\fP(1) does,
although this is likely to be an issue only for the person creating and
-testing the self-extracting archive. See \fIunzip\fP(1L) for details.
+testing the self-extracting archive. See \fIunzip\fP(1) for details.
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH DECRYPTION
-Decryption is supported exactly as in \fIunzip\fP(1L); that is, interactively
-with a non-echoing prompt for the password(s). See \fIunzip\fP(1L) for
+Decryption is supported exactly as in \fIunzip\fP(1); that is, interactively
+with a non-echoing prompt for the password(s). See \fIunzip\fP(1) for
details. Once again, note that if the archive has no encrypted files there
is no reason to use a version of \fIunzipsfx\fP with decryption support;
that only adds to the size of the archive.
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
from anywhere in the user's path. The situation is not known for AmigaDOS,
Atari TOS, MacOS, etc.
.PP
-As noted above, a number of the normal \fIunzip\fP(1L) functions have
+As noted above, a number of the normal \fIunzip\fP(1) functions have
been removed in order to make \fIunzipsfx\fP smaller: usage and diagnostic
info, listing functions and extraction to other directories. Also, only
stored and deflated files are supported. The latter limitation is mainly
@@ -303,17 +303,17 @@
defined as a ``debug hunk.'') There may be compatibility problems between
the ROM levels of older Amigas and newer ones.
.PP
-All current bugs in \fIunzip\fP(1L) exist in \fIunzipsfx\fP as well.
+All current bugs in \fIunzip\fP(1) exist in \fIunzipsfx\fP as well.
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH DIAGNOSTICS
\fIunzipsfx\fP's exit status (error level) is identical to that of
-\fIunzip\fP(1L); see the corresponding man page.
+\fIunzip\fP(1); see the corresponding man page.
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH "SEE ALSO"
-\fIfunzip\fP(1L), \fIunzip\fP(1L), \fIzip\fP(1L), \fIzipcloak\fP(1L),
-\fIzipgrep\fP(1L), \fIzipinfo\fP(1L), \fIzipnote\fP(1L), \fIzipsplit\fP(1L)
+\fIfunzip\fP(1), \fIunzip\fP(1), \fIzip\fP(1), \fIzipcloak\fP(1),
+\fIzipgrep\fP(1), \fIzipinfo\fP(1), \fIzipnote\fP(1), \fIzipsplit\fP(1)
.PD
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@
.\" =========================================================================
.SH AUTHORS
Greg Roelofs was responsible for the basic modifications to UnZip necessary
-to create UnZipSFX. See \fIunzip\fP(1L) for the current list of Zip-Bugs
+to create UnZipSFX. See \fIunzip\fP(1) for the current list of Zip-Bugs
authors, or the file CONTRIBS in the UnZip source distribution for the
full list of Info-ZIP contributors.
.PD
--- a/man/zipgrep.1
+++ b/man/zipgrep.1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
.\" zipgrep.1 by Greg Roelofs.
.\"
.\" =========================================================================
-.TH ZIPGREP 1L "20 April 2009" "Info-ZIP"
+.TH ZIPGREP 1 "20 April 2009" "Info-ZIP"
.SH NAME
zipgrep \- search files in a ZIP archive for lines matching a pattern
.PD
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
.SH DESCRIPTION
\fIzipgrep\fP will search files within a ZIP archive for lines matching
the given string or pattern. \fIzipgrep\fP is a shell script and requires
-\fIegrep\fP(1) and \fIunzip\fP(1L) to function. Its output is identical to
+\fIegrep\fP(1) and \fIunzip\fP(1) to function. Its output is identical to
that of \fIegrep\fP(1).
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH "SEE ALSO"
-\fIegrep\fP(1), \fIunzip\fP(1L), \fIzip\fP(1L), \fIfunzip\fP(1L),
-\fIzipcloak\fP(1L), \fIzipinfo\fP(1L), \fIzipnote\fP(1L), \fIzipsplit\fP(1L)
+\fIegrep\fP(1), \fIunzip\fP(1), \fIzip\fP(1), \fIfunzip\fP(1),
+\fIzipcloak\fP(1), \fIzipinfo\fP(1), \fIzipnote\fP(1), \fIzipsplit\fP(1)
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH URL
--- a/man/zipinfo.1
+++ b/man/zipinfo.1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
.in -4n
..
.\" =========================================================================
-.TH ZIPINFO 1L "20 April 2009 (v3.0)" "Info-ZIP"
+.TH ZIPINFO 1 "20 April 2009 (v3.0)" "Info-ZIP"
.SH NAME
zipinfo \- list detailed information about a ZIP archive
.PD
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
Note that because of limitations in the MS-DOS format used to store file
times, the seconds field is always rounded to the nearest even second.
For Unix files this is expected to change in the next major releases of
-\fIzip\fP(1L) and \fIunzip\fP.
+\fIzip\fP(1) and \fIunzip\fP.
.PP
In addition to individual file information, a default zipfile listing
also includes header and trailer lines:
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@
As suggested above, the default variable names are ZIPINFO_OPTS for VMS
(where the symbol used to install \fIzipinfo\fP as a foreign command
would otherwise be confused with the environment variable), and ZIPINFO
-for all other operating systems. For compatibility with \fIzip\fP(1L),
+for all other operating systems. For compatibility with \fIzip\fP(1),
ZIPINFOOPT is also accepted (don't ask). If both ZIPINFO and ZIPINFOOPT
are defined, however, ZIPINFO takes precedence. \fIunzip\fP's diagnostic
option (\fB\-v\fP with no zipfile name) can be used to check the values
@@ -496,8 +496,8 @@
.PP
.\" =========================================================================
.SH "SEE ALSO"
-\fIls\fP(1), \fIfunzip\fP(1L), \fIunzip\fP(1L), \fIunzipsfx\fP(1L),
-\fIzip\fP(1L), \fIzipcloak\fP(1L), \fIzipnote\fP(1L), \fIzipsplit\fP(1L)
+\fIls\fP(1), \fIfunzip\fP(1), \fIunzip\fP(1), \fIunzipsfx\fP(1),
+\fIzip\fP(1), \fIzipcloak\fP(1), \fIzipnote\fP(1), \fIzipsplit\fP(1)
.PD
.\" =========================================================================
.SH URL

18
package/unzip/0002-this-is-debian-unzip.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
From: Santiago Vila <sanvila@debian.org>
Subject: "Branding patch": UnZip by Debian. Original by Info-ZIP.
X-Debian-version: 5.52-5
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/02-this-is-debian-unzip.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/unzip.c
+++ b/unzip.c
@@ -570,8 +570,7 @@
#else /* !VMS */
# ifdef COPYRIGHT_CLEAN
static ZCONST char Far UnzipUsageLine1[] = "\
-UnZip %d.%d%d%s of %s, by Info-ZIP. Maintained by C. Spieler. Send\n\
-bug reports using http://www.info-zip.org/zip-bug.html; see README for details.\
+UnZip %d.%d%d%s of %s, by Debian. Original by Info-ZIP.\
\n\n";
# else
static ZCONST char Far UnzipUsageLine1[] = "\

17
package/unzip/0003-include-unistd-for-kfreebsd.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
From: Aurelien Jarno <aurel32@debian.org>
Subject: #include <unistd.h> for kFreeBSD
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/340693
X-Debian-version: 5.52-8
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/03-include-unistd-for-kfreebsd.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/unix/unxcfg.h
+++ b/unix/unxcfg.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h> /* off_t, time_t, dev_t, ... */
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef NO_OFF_T
typedef long zoff_t;

23
package/unzip/0004-handle-pkware-verification-bit.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Handle the PKWare verification bit of internal attributes
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/630078
X-Debian-version: 6.0-5
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/04-handle-pkware-verification-bit.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -1729,6 +1729,13 @@
else if (uO.L_flag > 1) /* let -LL force lower case for all names */
G.pInfo->lcflag = 1;
+ /* Handle the PKWare verification bit, bit 2 (0x0004) of internal
+ attributes. If this is set, then a verification checksum is in the
+ first 3 bytes of the external attributes. In this case all we can use
+ for setting file attributes is the last external attributes byte. */
+ if (G.crec.internal_file_attributes & 0x0004)
+ G.crec.external_file_attributes &= (ulg)0xff;
+
/* do Amigas (AMIGA_) also have volume labels? */
if (IS_VOLID(G.crec.external_file_attributes) &&
(G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_FAT_ || G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_HPFS_ ||

31
package/unzip/0005-fix-uid-gid-handling.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Restore uid and gid information when requested
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/689212
X-Debian-version: 6.0-8
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/05-fix-uid-gid-handling.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@
#ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID
if (eb_len >= EB_UX3_MINLEN
&& z_uidgid != NULL
- && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1)
+ && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1))
/* only know about version 1 */
{
uch uid_size;
@@ -2916,10 +2916,10 @@
flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous UNIX field */
if ( read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + 2) + ef_buf,
- uid_size, z_uidgid[0])
+ uid_size, &z_uidgid[0])
&&
read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 3) + ef_buf,
- gid_size, z_uidgid[1]) )
+ gid_size, &z_uidgid[1]) )
{
flags |= EB_UX2_VALID; /* signal success */
}

22
package/unzip/0006-initialize-the-symlink-flag.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
From: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Subject: Initialize the symlink flag
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/717029
X-Debian-version: 6.0-10
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/06-initialize-the-symlink-flag.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -1758,6 +1758,12 @@
= (G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag & (1 << 11)) == (1 << 11);
#endif
+#ifdef SYMLINKS
+ /* Initialize the symlink flag, may be set by the platform-specific
+ mapattr function. */
+ G.pInfo->symlink = 0;
+#endif
+
return PK_COOL;
} /* end function process_cdir_file_hdr() */

19
package/unzip/0007-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/741384
X-Debian-version: 6.0-11
CVE: CVE-2018-18384
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/07-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/list.c
+++ b/list.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
{
int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
#ifndef WINDLL
- char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
+ char sgn, cfactorstr[12];
int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
#endif
int date_format;

16
package/unzip/0008-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
From: Santiago Vila <sanvila@debian.org>
Subject: zipinfo.c: Do not crash when hostver byte is >= 100
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/08-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/zipinfo.c
+++ b/zipinfo.c
@@ -2114,7 +2114,7 @@
else
attribs[9] = (xattr & UNX_ISVTX)? 'T' : '-'; /* T==undefined */
- sprintf(&attribs[12], "%u.%u", hostver/10, hostver%10);
+ sprintf(&attribs[11], "%2u.%u", hostver/10, hostver%10);
break;
} /* end switch (hostnum: external attributes format) */

56
package/unzip/0009-cve-2014-8139-crc-overflow.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8139: CRC32 verification heap-based overflow
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/773722
CVE: CVE-2014-8139
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/09-cve-2014-8139-crc-overflow.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later
(the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@
#ifndef SFX
static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \
EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n";
+ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEBlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \
+ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n";
static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] =
" invalid compressed data for EAs\n";
# if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS))
@@ -2023,7 +2025,8 @@
ebID = makeword(ef);
ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN);
- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) {
+ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE))
+ {
/* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */
if (uO.qflag)
Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ",
@@ -2158,11 +2161,19 @@
}
break;
case EF_PKVMS:
- if (makelong(ef+EB_HEADSIZE) !=
+ if (ebLen < 4)
+ {
+ Info(slide, 1,
+ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(TooSmallEBlength),
+ ebLen, 4));
+ }
+ else if (makelong(ef+EB_HEADSIZE) !=
crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ef+(EB_HEADSIZE+4),
(extent)(ebLen-4)))
+ {
Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide,
LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs)));
+ }
break;
case EF_PKW32:
case EF_PKUNIX:

30
package/unzip/0010-cve-2014-8140-test-compr-eb.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8140: out-of-bounds write issue in test_compr_eb()
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/773722
CVE: CVE-2014-8140
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/10-cve-2014-8140-test-compr-eb.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2232,10 +2232,17 @@
if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */
return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */
+ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found:
+ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size
+ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.)
+ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS.
+ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold
+ * the compressed data header.
+ */
if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) ||
- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L &&
- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */
+ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) ||
+ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))))
+ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */
if (
#ifdef INT_16BIT

140
package/unzip/0011-cve-2014-8141-getzip64data.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8141: out-of-bounds read issues in getZip64Data()
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/773722
CVE: CVE-2014-8141
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/11-cve-2014-8141-getzip64data.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/fileio.c
+++ b/fileio.c
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@
#endif
static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] =
"warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n";
+static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] =
+ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n";
#ifdef WINDLL
static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] =
@@ -2295,7 +2297,12 @@
if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0)
return PK_EOF;
/* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */
- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length);
+ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL)
+ {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64));
+ error = PK_WARN;
+ }
#ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT
G.unipath_filename = NULL;
if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) {
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later
(the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
@@ -1901,48 +1901,82 @@
and a 4-byte version of disk start number.
Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever,
but it means that this procedure is only called in one place.
+
+ 2014-12-05 SMS.
+ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling
+ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with
+ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend
+ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now
+ stay within the buffer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+#define Z64FLGS 0xffff
+#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
+
if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
return PK_COOL;
Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n",
ef_len));
- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) {
+ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE)
+ {
eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf);
eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf);
- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) {
- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */
+ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE))
+ {
+ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */
Trace((stderr,
"getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len,
ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE));
break;
}
- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) {
-
+ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64)
+ {
int offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){
- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize);
+ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL))
+ {
+ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len)
+ return PK_ERR;
+
+ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
+ offset += 8;
}
- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){
- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize);
+
+ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL))
+ {
+ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len)
+ return PK_ERR;
+
+ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
+ offset += 8;
}
- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){
+
+ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL)
+ {
+ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len)
+ return PK_ERR;
+
G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header);
+ offset += 8;
}
- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){
+
+ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS)
+ {
+ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len)
+ return PK_ERR;
+
G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf);
- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start);
+ offset += 4;
}
+#if 0
+ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */
+#endif /* 0 */
}
- /* Skip this extra field block */
+ /* Skip this extra field block. */
ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE);
ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE);
}

44
package/unzip/0012-cve-2014-9636-test-compr-eb.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com>
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015
Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/776589
By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that
purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding
uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can
trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or
possibly have other unspecified impact.
This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the
"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match.
CVE: CVE-2014-9636
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/12-cve-2014-9636-test-compr-eb.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2228,6 +2228,7 @@
ulg eb_ucsize;
uch *eb_ucptr;
int r;
+ ush eb_compr_method;
if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */
return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */
@@ -2244,6 +2245,15 @@
((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))))
return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */
+ /* 2015-02-10 Mancha(?), Michal Zalewski, Tomas Hoger, SMS.
+ * For STORE method, compressed and uncompressed sizes must agree.
+ * http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450
+ */
+ eb_compr_method = makeword( eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
+ if ((eb_compr_method == STORED) &&
+ (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize))
+ return PK_ERR;
+
if (
#ifdef INT_16BIT
(((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) ||

20
package/unzip/0013-remove-build-date.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
From: Jérémy Bobbio <lunar@debian.org>
Subject: Remove build date
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/782851
In order to make unzip build reproducibly, we remove the
(already optional) build date from the binary.
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/13-remove-build-date.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/unix/unix.c
+++ b/unix/unix.c
@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@
#endif /* Sun */
#endif /* SGI */
-#ifdef __DATE__
+#if 0
" on ", __DATE__
#else
"", ""

35
package/unzip/0014-cve-2015-7696.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
Subject: Upstream fix for heap overflow
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/802162
Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1260944
Origin: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
Forwarded: yes
CVE: CVE-2015-7696
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/14-cve-2015-7696.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
---
crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypt.c
+++ b/crypt.c
@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@
GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
defer_leftover_input(__G);
for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
- b = NEXTBYTE;
+ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
+ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
+ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
+ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
+ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
+ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
+ */
+ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
+ {
+ return PK_ERR;
+ }
h[n] = (uch)b;
Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
}

29
package/unzip/0015-cve-2015-7697.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
Subject: fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/802160
Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1260944
Origin: other, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073339
CVE: CVE-2015-7697
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/15-cve-2015-7697.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
---
extract.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2729,6 +2729,12 @@
int repeated_buf_err;
bz_stream bstrm;
+ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
+ /* avoid an infinite loop */
+ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
+ return 2;
+ }
+
#if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
if (G.redirect_slide)
wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;

34
package/unzip/0016-fix-integer-underflow-csiz-decrypted.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
Origin: other, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1075942
Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1260944
Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/16-fix-integer-underflow-csiz-decrypted.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
---
extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@
if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
+ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
+ if (csiz_decrypted < 12) {
+ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
+ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
+ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
+ return PK_ERR;
+ }
csiz_decrypted -= 12;
+ }
if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),

43
package/unzip/0017-restore-unix-timestamps-accurately.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Do not ignore extra fields containing Unix Timestamps
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/842993
X-Debian-version: 6.0-21
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/17-restore-unix-timestamps-accurately.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -2914,10 +2914,13 @@
break;
case EF_IZUNIX2:
- if (have_new_type_eb == 0) {
- flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous IZUNIX field */
+ if (have_new_type_eb == 0) { /* (< 1) */
have_new_type_eb = 1;
}
+ if (have_new_type_eb <= 1) {
+ /* Ignore any prior (EF_IZUNIX/EF_PKUNIX) UID/GID. */
+ flags &= 0x0ff;
+ }
#ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID
if (have_new_type_eb > 1)
break; /* IZUNIX3 overrides IZUNIX2 e.f. block ! */
@@ -2933,6 +2936,8 @@
/* new 3rd generation Unix ef */
have_new_type_eb = 2;
+ /* Ignore any prior EF_IZUNIX/EF_PKUNIX/EF_IZUNIX2 UID/GID. */
+ flags &= 0x0ff;
/*
Version 1 byte version of this extra field, currently 1
UIDSize 1 byte Size of UID field
@@ -2953,8 +2958,6 @@
uid_size = *((EB_HEADSIZE + 1) + ef_buf);
gid_size = *((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 2) + ef_buf);
- flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous UNIX field */
-
if ( read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + 2) + ef_buf,
uid_size, &z_uidgid[0])
&&

32
package/unzip/0018-cve-2014-9913-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix CVE-2014-9913, buffer overflow in unzip
Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/27/
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/847485
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/387350
X-Debian-version: 6.0-21
CVE: CVE-2014-9913
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/18-cve-2014-9913-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/list.c
+++ b/list.c
@@ -339,7 +339,18 @@
G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) {
methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3];
} else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) {
- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
+ /* 2013-02-26 SMS.
+ * http://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/27/ CVE-2014-9913.
+ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow
+ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format
+ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the
+ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal.
+ */
+ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) {
+ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
+ } else {
+ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method);
+ }
}
#if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */

31
package/unzip/0019-cve-2016-9844-zipinfo-buffer-overflow.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix CVE-2016-9844, buffer overflow in zipinfo
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/847486
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1643750
X-Debian-version: 6.0-21
CVE: CVE-2016-9844
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/19-cve-2016-9844-zipinfo-buffer-overflow.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/zipinfo.c
+++ b/zipinfo.c
@@ -1921,7 +1921,18 @@
ush dnum=(ush)((G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3);
methbuf[3] = dtype[dnum];
} else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) { /* unknown */
- sprintf(&methbuf[1], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
+ /* 2016-12-05 SMS.
+ * https://launchpad.net/bugs/1643750
+ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow
+ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format
+ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the "u",
+ * and use four-digit hexadecimal.
+ */
+ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) {
+ sprintf( &methbuf[ 1], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
+ } else {
+ sprintf( &methbuf[ 0], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method);
+ }
}
for (k = 0; k < 15; ++k)

39
package/unzip/0020-cve-2018-1000035-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From: Karol Babioch <kbabioch@suse.com>
Subject: Fix buffer overflow in password protected zip archives
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/889838
Origin: https://bugzilla.novell.com/attachment.cgi?id=759406
X-Debian-version: 6.0-22
CVE: CVE-2018-1000035
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/20-cve-2018-1000035-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/fileio.c
+++ b/fileio.c
@@ -1582,6 +1582,10 @@
int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED;
char *m;
char *prompt;
+ char *zfnf;
+ char *efnf;
+ size_t zfnfl;
+ int isOverflow;
#ifndef REENTRANT
/* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */
@@ -1590,7 +1594,15 @@
if (*rcnt == 0) { /* First call for current entry */
*rcnt = 2;
- if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) {
+ zfnf = FnFilter1(zfn);
+ efnf = FnFilter2(efn);
+ zfnfl = strlen(zfnf);
+ isOverflow = TRUE;
+ if (2*FILNAMSIZ >= zfnfl && (2*FILNAMSIZ - zfnfl) >= strlen(efnf))
+ {
+ isOverflow = FALSE;
+ }
+ if ((isOverflow == FALSE) && ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL)) {
sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt),
FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn));
m = prompt;

16
package/unzip/0021-fix-warning-messages-on-big-files.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix lame code in fileio.c
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/929502
X-Debian-version: 6.0-23
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/21-fix-warning-messages-on-big-files.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/fileio.c
+++ b/fileio.c
@@ -2477,6 +2477,7 @@
*/
return (((zusz_t)sig[7]) << 56)
+ (((zusz_t)sig[6]) << 48)
+ + (((zusz_t)sig[5]) << 40)
+ (((zusz_t)sig[4]) << 32)
+ (zusz_t)((((ulg)sig[3]) << 24)
+ (((ulg)sig[2]) << 16)

25
package/unzip/0022-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-undefer-input.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
Subject: Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input state.
Origin: https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/931433
X-Debian-version: 6.0-24
Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input state.
CVE: CVE-2019-13232
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/22-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-undefer-input.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/fileio.c
+++ b/fileio.c
@@ -532,8 +532,10 @@
* This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in
* defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize
* before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0)
- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
+ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
*/
+ if (G.csize < 0L)
+ G.csize = 0L;
G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize;
G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize;
G.incnt_leftover = 0;

338
package/unzip/0023-cve-2019-13232-zip-bomb-with-overlapped-entries.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
Subject: Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
Origin: https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/931433
X-Debian-version: 6.0-24
Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
zip file is rejected.
See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
invalid.
This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
undefer_input() that misplaced the input state."
CVE: CVE-2019-13232
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/23-cve-2019-13232-zip-bomb-with-overlapped-entries.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -321,6 +321,125 @@
"\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n";
static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
"error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n";
+static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
+ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
+static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
+ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
+
+
+
+
+
+/* A growable list of spans. */
+typedef zoff_t bound_t;
+typedef struct {
+ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */
+ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */
+} span_t;
+typedef struct {
+ span_t *span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */
+ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */
+ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */
+} cover_t;
+
+/*
+ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
+ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned.
+ */
+static size_t cover_find(cover, val)
+ cover_t *cover;
+ bound_t val;
+{
+ size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num;
+ while (lo < hi) {
+ size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
+ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
+ hi = mid;
+ else
+ lo = mid + 1;
+ }
+ return hi;
+}
+
+/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */
+static int cover_within(cover, val)
+ cover_t *cover;
+ bound_t val;
+{
+ size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val);
+ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
+ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
+ * must be less than end.
+ *
+ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
+ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
+ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
+ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
+ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
+ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
+ */
+static int cover_add(cover, beg, end)
+ cover_t *cover;
+ bound_t beg;
+ bound_t end;
+{
+ size_t pos;
+ int prec, foll;
+
+ if (beg >= end)
+ /* The new span is invalid. */
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not
+ overlap with any existing spans. */
+ pos = cover_find(cover, beg);
+ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
+ (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Check for adjacencies. */
+ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end;
+ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg;
+ if (prec && foll) {
+ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the
+ following span into the preceding span, and delete the following
+ span. */
+ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end;
+ cover->num--;
+ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,
+ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
+ }
+ else if (prec)
+ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end
+ of the preceding span. */
+ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
+ else if (foll)
+ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the
+ beginning of the following span. */
+ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
+ else {
+ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following
+ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span. */
+ if (cover->num == cover->max) {
+ size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1;
+ span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t));
+ if (span == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ cover->span = span;
+ cover->max = max;
+ }
+ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos,
+ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
+ cover->num++;
+ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
+ cover->span[pos].end = end;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
@@ -376,6 +495,29 @@
}
#endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
+ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
+ span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
+ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
+ }
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
+ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
+ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
+ G.ziplen) != 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
+
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the
@@ -593,7 +735,8 @@
if (error > error_in_archive)
error_in_archive = error;
/* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */
- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) {
+ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC ||
+ error == PK_BOMB) {
/* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */
reached_end = FALSE;
/* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */
@@ -1062,6 +1205,11 @@
/* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */
request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
+ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+ return PK_BOMB;
+ }
inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
@@ -1602,6 +1750,18 @@
return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */
}
#endif
+ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
+ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
+ if (error < 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
+ if (error != 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+ return PK_BOMB;
+ }
#ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
UserStop();
#endif
@@ -2003,6 +2163,34 @@
}
undefer_input(__G);
+
+ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
+ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
+ * ambiguity)
+ */
+# define SIG 0x08074b50
+# define LOW 0xffffffff
+ uch buf[12];
+ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
+ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
+ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
+ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
+ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
+ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
+ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
+ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
+ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
+ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
+ /* if not SIG, have signature */
+ )))))
+ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
+ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
+ if (G.zip64)
+ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
+ if (shy)
+ error = PK_ERR;
+ }
+
return error;
} /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
--- a/globals.c
+++ b/globals.c
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@
# if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
# endif
+ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
#endif
uO.lflag=(-1);
--- a/globals.h
+++ b/globals.h
@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@
ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
+ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
+
int mem_mode;
uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */
ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */
int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */
int disk_full;
int newfile;
+ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */
int didCRlast; /* fileio static */
ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number of lines printed */
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@
}
#endif
+ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */
+ if (G.cover != NULL) {
+ free(*(G.cover));
+ free(G.cover);
+ G.cover = NULL;
+ }
+
} /* end function free_G_buffers() */
@@ -1913,6 +1920,8 @@
#define Z64FLGS 0xffff
#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
+ G.zip64 = FALSE;
+
if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
return PK_COOL;
@@ -2084,6 +2093,8 @@
(ZCONST char *)(offset + ef_buf), ULen);
G.unipath_filename[ULen] = '\0';
}
+
+ G.zip64 = TRUE;
}
/* Skip this extra field block */
--- a/unzip.h
+++ b/unzip.h
@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@
#define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */
#define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parameters specified */
#define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */
+#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */
#define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */
#define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */

106
package/unzip/0024-cve-2019-13232-do-not-raise-alert-for-misplaced-central-directory.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
Subject: Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplaced central directory.
Origin: https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/6d351831be705cc26d897db44f878a978f4138fc
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/932404
X-Debian-version: 6.0-25
Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplaced central directory.
There is a zip-like file in the Firefox distribution, omni.ja,
which is a zip container with the central directory placed at the
start of the file instead of after the local entries as required
by the zip standard. This commit marks the actual location of the
central directory, as well as the end of central directory records,
as disallowed locations. This now permits such containers to not
raise a zip bomb alert, where in fact there are no overlaps.
CVE: CVE-2019-13232
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/24-cve-2019-13232-do-not-raise-alert-for-misplaced-central-directory.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -495,8 +495,11 @@
}
#endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
- /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
- span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
+ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with
+ spans that cover any extra bytes at the start, the central directory,
+ the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central
+ directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory
+ record, if present. */
if (G.cover == NULL) {
G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
if (G.cover == NULL) {
@@ -508,15 +511,25 @@
((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
}
((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
- if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
+ if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
- G.ziplen) != 0) {
+ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
+ G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {
Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
return PK_MEM;
}
+ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
+ (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 &&
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start,
+ G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) ||
+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start,
+ G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+ return PK_BOMB;
+ }
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -1408,6 +1408,10 @@
/* Now, we are (almost) sure that we have a Zip64 archive. */
G.ecrec.have_ecr64 = 1;
+ G.ecrec.ec_start -= ECLOC64_SIZE+4;
+ G.ecrec.ec64_start = ecrec64_start_offset;
+ G.ecrec.ec64_end = ecrec64_start_offset +
+ 12 + makeint64(&byterec[ECREC64_LENGTH]);
/* Update the "end-of-central-dir offset" for later checks. */
G.real_ecrec_offset = ecrec64_start_offset;
@@ -1542,6 +1546,8 @@
makelong(&byterec[OFFSET_START_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY]);
G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length =
makeword(&byterec[ZIPFILE_COMMENT_LENGTH]);
+ G.ecrec.ec_start = G.real_ecrec_offset;
+ G.ecrec.ec_end = G.ecrec.ec_start + 22 + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length;
/* Now, we have to read the archive comment, BEFORE the file pointer
is moved away backwards to seek for a Zip64 ECLOC64 structure.
--- a/unzpriv.h
+++ b/unzpriv.h
@@ -2185,6 +2185,16 @@
int have_ecr64; /* valid Zip64 ecdir-record exists */
int is_zip64_archive; /* Zip64 ecdir-record is mandatory */
ush zipfile_comment_length;
+ zusz_t ec_start, ec_end; /* offsets of start and end of the
+ end of central directory record,
+ including if present the Zip64
+ end of central directory locator,
+ which immediately precedes the
+ end of central directory record */
+ zusz_t ec64_start, ec64_end; /* if have_ecr64 is true, then these
+ are the offsets of the start and
+ end of the Zip64 end of central
+ directory record */
} ecdir_rec;

26
package/unzip/0025-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-uzbunzip2.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
Subject: Fix bug in UZbunzip2() that incorrectly updated G.incnt
Origin: https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/5e2efcd633a4a1fb95a129a75508e7d769e767be
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/963996
X-Debian-version: 6.0-26
Fix bug in UZbunzip2() that incorrectly updated G.incnt.
The update assumed a full buffer, which is not always full. This
could result in a false overlapped element detection when a small
bzip2-compressed file was unzipped. This commit remedies that.
CVE: CVE-2019-13232
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/25-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-uzbunzip2.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -3052,7 +3052,7 @@
#endif
G.inptr = (uch *)bstrm.next_in;
- G.incnt = (G.inbuf + INBUFSIZ) - G.inptr; /* reset for other routines */
+ G.incnt -= G.inptr - G.inbuf; /* reset for other routines */
uzbunzip_cleanup_exit:
err = BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&bstrm);

26
package/unzip/0026-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-uzinflate.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
Subject: Fix bug in UZinflate() that incorrectly updated G.incnt.
Origin: https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/5c572555cf5d80309a07c30cf7a54b2501493720
X-Debian-version: 6.0-26
Fix bug in UZinflate() that incorrectly updated G.incnt.
The update assumed a full buffer, which is not always full. This
could result in a false overlapped element detection when a small
deflate-compressed file was unzipped using an old zlib. This
commit remedies that.
CVE: CVE-2019-13232
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/26-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-uzinflate.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/inflate.c
+++ b/inflate.c
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@
G.dstrm.total_out));
G.inptr = (uch *)G.dstrm.next_in;
- G.incnt = (G.inbuf + INBUFSIZ) - G.inptr; /* reset for other routines */
+ G.incnt -= G.inptr - G.inbuf; /* reset for other routines */
uzinflate_cleanup_exit:
err = inflateReset(&G.dstrm);

17
package/unzip/0027-zipgrep-avoid-test-errors.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
From: Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>
Subject: zipgrep: Avoid test errors when no members present
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/972233
X-Debian-version: 6.0-26
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/27-zipgrep-avoid-test-errors.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/unix/zipgrep
+++ b/unix/zipgrep
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
opt="-$opt"
fi
+sts=0
status_grep_global=1
IFS='
'

177
package/unzip/0028-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
From: Steven M. Schweda <sms@antinode.info>
Subject: Fix for CVE-2022-0529 and CVE-2022-0530
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1010355
X-Debian-version: 6.0-27
CVE: CVE-2022-0529
CVE: CVE-2022-0530
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/fileio.c
+++ b/fileio.c
@@ -171,8 +171,10 @@
static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
"warning: filename too long--truncating.\n";
#ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT
+ static ZCONST char Far UFilenameCorrupt[] =
+ "error: Unicode filename corrupt.\n";
static ZCONST char Far UFilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
- "warning: Converted unicode filename too long--truncating.\n";
+ "warning: Converted Unicode filename too long--truncating.\n";
#endif
static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] =
"warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n";
@@ -2361,16 +2363,30 @@
/* convert UTF-8 to local character set */
fn = utf8_to_local_string(G.unipath_filename,
G.unicode_escape_all);
- /* make sure filename is short enough */
- if (strlen(fn) >= FILNAMSIZ) {
- fn[FILNAMSIZ - 1] = '\0';
+
+ /* 2022-07-22 SMS, et al. CVE-2022-0530
+ * Detect conversion failure, emit message.
+ * Continue with unconverted name.
+ */
+ if (fn == NULL)
+ {
Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
- LoadFarString(UFilenameTooLongTrunc)));
- error = PK_WARN;
+ LoadFarString(UFilenameCorrupt)));
+ error = PK_ERR;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* make sure filename is short enough */
+ if (strlen(fn) >= FILNAMSIZ) {
+ fn[FILNAMSIZ - 1] = '\0';
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(UFilenameTooLongTrunc)));
+ error = PK_WARN;
+ }
+ /* replace filename with converted UTF-8 */
+ strcpy(G.filename, fn);
+ free(fn);
}
- /* replace filename with converted UTF-8 */
- strcpy(G.filename, fn);
- free(fn);
}
# endif /* UNICODE_WCHAR */
if (G.unipath_filename != G.filename_full)
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@
"\nwarning: Unicode Path version > 1\n";
static ZCONST char Far UnicodeMismatchError[] =
"\nwarning: Unicode Path checksum invalid\n";
+ static ZCONST char Far UFilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
+ "warning: filename too long (P1) -- truncating.\n";
#endif
@@ -1915,7 +1917,7 @@
Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever,
but it means that this procedure is only called in one place.
- 2014-12-05 SMS.
+ 2014-12-05 SMS. (oCERT.org report.) CVE-2014-8141.
Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling
makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with
simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend
@@ -1947,9 +1949,10 @@
ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE));
break;
}
+
if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64)
{
- int offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
+ unsigned offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL))
{
@@ -2046,7 +2049,7 @@
}
if (eb_id == EF_UNIPATH) {
- int offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
+ unsigned offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
ush ULen = eb_len - 5;
ulg chksum = CRCVAL_INITIAL;
@@ -2504,16 +2507,17 @@
int state_dependent;
int wsize = 0;
int max_bytes = MB_CUR_MAX;
- char buf[9];
+ char buf[ MB_CUR_MAX+ 1]; /* ("+1" not really needed?) */
char *buffer = NULL;
char *local_string = NULL;
+ size_t buffer_size; /* CVE-2022-0529 */
for (wsize = 0; wide_string[wsize]; wsize++) ;
if (max_bytes < MAX_ESCAPE_BYTES)
max_bytes = MAX_ESCAPE_BYTES;
-
- if ((buffer = (char *)malloc(wsize * max_bytes + 1)) == NULL) {
+ buffer_size = wsize * max_bytes + 1; /* Reused below. */
+ if ((buffer = (char *)malloc( buffer_size)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -2551,8 +2555,28 @@
} else {
/* no MB for this wide */
/* use escape for wide character */
- char *escape_string = wide_to_escape_string(wide_string[i]);
- strcat(buffer, escape_string);
+ size_t buffer_len;
+ size_t escape_string_len;
+ char *escape_string;
+ int err_msg = 0;
+
+ escape_string = wide_to_escape_string(wide_string[i]);
+ buffer_len = strlen( buffer);
+ escape_string_len = strlen( escape_string);
+
+ /* Append escape string, as space allows. */
+ /* 2022-07-18 SMS, et al. CVE-2022-0529 */
+ if (escape_string_len > buffer_size- buffer_len- 1)
+ {
+ escape_string_len = buffer_size- buffer_len- 1;
+ if (err_msg == 0)
+ {
+ err_msg = 1;
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString( UFilenameTooLongTrunc)));
+ }
+ }
+ strncat( buffer, escape_string, escape_string_len);
free(escape_string);
}
}
@@ -2604,9 +2628,18 @@
ZCONST char *utf8_string;
int escape_all;
{
- zwchar *wide = utf8_to_wide_string(utf8_string);
- char *loc = wide_to_local_string(wide, escape_all);
- free(wide);
+ zwchar *wide;
+ char *loc = NULL;
+
+ wide = utf8_to_wide_string( utf8_string);
+
+ /* 2022-07-25 SMS, et al. CVE-2022-0530 */
+ if (wide != NULL)
+ {
+ loc = wide_to_local_string( wide, escape_all);
+ free( wide);
+ }
+
return loc;
}

21
package/unzip/0029-handle-windows-zip64-files.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
From: Roy Tam
Subject: Handle Microsoft ZIP64 files by ignoring invalid "Total number of disks" field
Origin: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/42/
Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/42/
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1064000
Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/unzip/+bug/2051952
X-Debian-version: 6.0-29
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/29-handle-windows-zip64-files.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/process.c
+++ b/process.c
@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@
fprintf(stdout,"\nnumber of disks (ECR) %u, (ECLOC64) %lu\n",
G.ecrec.number_this_disk, ecloc64_total_disks); fflush(stdout);
#endif
- if ((G.ecrec.number_this_disk != 0xFFFF) &&
+ if ((G.ecrec.number_this_disk != 0xFFFF) && ecloc64_total_disks &&
(G.ecrec.number_this_disk != ecloc64_total_disks - 1)) {
/* Note: For some unknown reason, the developers at PKWARE decided to
store the "zip64 total disks" value as a counter starting from 1,

18
package/unzip/0030-drop-conflicting-declarations.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
From: Santiago Vila <sanvila@debian.org>
Subject: Drop conflicting declarations of gmtime() and localtime()
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1098043
X-Debian-version: 6.0-29
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/30-drop-conflicting-declarations.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/unix/unxcfg.h
+++ b/unix/unxcfg.h
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
# endif
#else
# include <time.h>
- struct tm *gmtime(), *localtime();
+/* struct tm *gmtime(), *localtime(); */
#endif
#if (defined(BSD4_4) || (defined(SYSV) && defined(MODERN)))

20
package/unzip/0031-fix-zipgrep.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
From: Vincent Lefevre <vincent@vinc17.net>
Subject: Do not escape shell-special characters in "pat"
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1054628
X-Debian-version: 6.0-29
Upstream: https://sources.debian.org/src/unzip/6.0-29/debian/patches/31-fix-zipgrep.patch
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
--- a/unix/zipgrep
+++ b/unix/zipgrep
@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
IFS='
'
-# Escape shell-special characters in "pat".
-pat=` echo "$pat" | \
- sed -e 's/\\\\/\\\\\\\\/g' -e 's/|/\\\|/g' -e 's/&/\\\&/g' `
-
# Use "unzip -Z1" to get a listing of the specified members from the
# specified archive. Escape any backslashes in a file name.
for i in `unzip -Z1 "$zipfile" ${1+"$@"} | sed -e 's/\\\\/\\\\\\\\/g' `; do

1
package/unzip/0001-Add-a-CMakeFile.txt-to-ease-cross-compilation.patch → package/unzip/0101-Add-a-CMakeFile.txt-to-ease-cross-compilation.patch
View File

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ build options and flags as the original Makefile does.
[0] http://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/tree/package/infozip?id=2015.11-rc3
Upstream: N/A
Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca@lucaceresoli.net>
---
CMakeLists.txt | 17 +++++++++++++++++

55
package/unzip/unzip.mk
View File

@@ -6,27 +6,50 @@
UNZIP_VERSION = 6.0
UNZIP_SOURCE = unzip_$(UNZIP_VERSION).orig.tar.gz
UNZIP_PATCH = unzip_$(UNZIP_VERSION)-29.debian.tar.xz
UNZIP_SITE = https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20250311T215724Z/pool/main/u/unzip
UNZIP_LICENSE = Info-ZIP
UNZIP_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE
UNZIP_CPE_ID_VALID = YES
# unzip_$(UNZIP_VERSION)-29.debian.tar.xz has patches to fix:
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES = \
CVE-2014-8139 \
CVE-2014-8140 \
CVE-2014-8141 \
CVE-2014-9636 \
CVE-2014-9913 \
CVE-2015-7696 \
CVE-2015-7697 \
CVE-2016-9844 \
CVE-2018-18384 \
CVE-2018-1000035 \
CVE-2019-13232 \
CVE-2022-0529 \
CVE-2022-0530
# 0009-cve-2014-8139-crc-overflow.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2014-8139
# 0010-cve-2014-8140-test-compr-eb.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2014-8140
# 0011-cve-2014-8141-getzip64data.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2014-8141
# 0012-cve-2014-9636-test-compr-eb.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2014-9636
# 0018-cve-2014-9913-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2014-9913
# 0014-cve-2015-7696.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2015-7696
# 0015-cve-2015-7697.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2015-7697
# 0019-cve-2016-9844-zipinfo-buffer-overflow.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2016-9844
# 0007-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-18384
# 0020-cve-2018-1000035-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000035
# 0022-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-undefer-input.patch
# 0023-cve-2019-13232-zip-bomb-with-overlapped-entries.patch
# 0024-cve-2019-13232-do-not-raise-alert-for-misplaced-central-directory.patch
# 0025-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-uzbunzip2.patch
# 0026-cve-2019-13232-fix-bug-in-uzinflate.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-13232
# 0028-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch
UNZIP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-0529 CVE-2022-0530
# unzip already defines _LARGEFILE_SOURCE and _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE when
# necessary, redefining it on the command line causes some warnings.