Files
buildroot/boot/grub2/0039-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch
Thomas Petazzoni ded3e0045a boot/grub2: add patches to fix numerous CVEs
This patch brings the entire stack of Debian patches on grub2 titled
"cve-2025-jan" and available at:

  https://salsa.debian.org/grub-team/grub/-/tree/debian/2.12-9/debian/patches/cve-2025-jan?ref_type=tags

As of this exact Debian grub2 version 2.12-9. Some minor conflicts had
to be fixed. All patches are in upstream Grub master, but mixed with
hundreds of other changes, which is why Debian's effort to backport
them has been leveraged here.

In addition to those patches, 2 extra patches are added:

 0073-net-drivers-ieee1275-ofnet-Add-missing-grub_malloc.patch
 0074-Constant-time-grub_crypto_memcmp.patch

The first one fixes an issue in one of the earlier patches. The fix is
not in Debian, but is in upstream Grub.

The second one fixes another CVE, not fixed in Debian, but fixed in
OpenSUSE. This fix is not upstream as upstream has decided to move to
libgcrypt instead to avoid the problem, but that's a fairly large
change.

Overall, this patch fixes all CVEs currently reported by pkg-stats
against our grub2 package, namely:

CVE-2024-45777
CVE-2024-45778
CVE-2024-45779
CVE-2024-45780
CVE-2024-45782
CVE-2024-56737
CVE-2024-56738
CVE-2025-0678
CVE-2025-0684
CVE-2025-0685
CVE-2025-0686
CVE-2025-0689
CVE-2025-1125

With the previous fixes on runtime tests added (to use glibc
toolchains to build grub2 tests), this commit successfully passes all
tests:

- The ISO9660 tests that use grub2:
  https://gitlab.com/tpetazzoni/buildroot/-/pipelines/1985234563

- The grub2 tests:
  https://gitlab.com/tpetazzoni/buildroot/-/pipelines/1985234685

Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
[Julien: also tested by building and booting
 - qemu_aarch64_sbsa_defconfig
 - qemu_arm_ebbr_defconfig
 - qemu_loongarch64_virt_efi_defconfig
 - qemu_riscv64_virt_efi_defconfig
 - pc_x86_64_bios_defconfig
 - pc_x86_64_efi_defconfig
]
Tested-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
[Julien:
 - fix patch #72 upstream link to point to the initial patch
   sumbission rather than a reply
 - merge two _IGNORE_CVES blocks for patch #50 into a single one
 - order _IGNORE_CVES blocks by numerical patch order
 - order numerically the CVE list in commit log
 - add a "Fixes:" tag in patch #74 since its commit log does not
   mention the CVE.
]
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
2025-08-19 02:50:55 +02:00

89 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff

From 926fe49003b6b46d595d5900893c8ca79710bbd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] commands/test: Stack overflow due to unlimited recursion
depth
The test_parse() evaluates test expression recursively. Due to lack of
recursion depth check a specially crafted expression may cause a stack
overflow. The recursion is only triggered by the parentheses usage and
it can be unlimited. However, sensible expressions are unlikely to
contain more than a few parentheses. So, this patch limits the recursion
depth to 100, which should be sufficient.
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Upstream: c68b7d23628a19da67ebe2e06f84165ee04961af
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
---
grub-core/commands/test.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/test.c b/grub-core/commands/test.c
index 62d3fb398..b585c3d70 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/test.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/test.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+/* Set a limit on recursion to avoid stack overflow. */
+#define MAX_TEST_RECURSION_DEPTH 100
+
/* A simple implementation for signed numbers. */
static int
grub_strtosl (char *arg, const char ** const end, int base)
@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ get_fileinfo (char *path, struct test_parse_ctx *ctx)
/* Parse a test expression starting from *argn. */
static int
-test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc)
+test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc, int *depth)
{
struct test_parse_ctx ctx = {
.and = 1,
@@ -387,13 +390,24 @@ test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc)
if (grub_strcmp (args[*argn], ")") == 0)
{
(*argn)++;
+ if (*depth > 0)
+ (*depth)--;
+
return ctx.or || ctx.and;
}
/* Recursively invoke if parenthesis. */
if (grub_strcmp (args[*argn], "(") == 0)
{
(*argn)++;
- update_val (test_parse (args, argn, argc), &ctx);
+
+ if (++(*depth) > MAX_TEST_RECURSION_DEPTH)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("max recursion depth exceeded"));
+ depth--;
+ return ctx.or || ctx.and;
+ }
+
+ update_val (test_parse (args, argn, argc, depth), &ctx);
continue;
}
@@ -428,11 +442,12 @@ grub_cmd_test (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
int argc, char **args)
{
int argn = 0;
+ int depth = 0;
if (argc >= 1 && grub_strcmp (args[argc - 1], "]") == 0)
argc--;
- return test_parse (args, &argn, argc) ? GRUB_ERR_NONE
+ return test_parse (args, &argn, argc, &depth) ? GRUB_ERR_NONE
: grub_error (GRUB_ERR_TEST_FAILURE, N_("false"));
}
--
2.50.1